Speaking in a second language but thinking in the first language: Language-specific effects on memory for causation events in English and Spanish by Filipovic, Luna
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1 
2 
3 1.   Introduction
1
 
4 
5 
6 
7 
The  goal  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  whether  an  L2  can  have  consequences  for     the 
8 
9 
10 speaker’s  memory  of  events  in  a  cognitive   domain  that   involves  typological      contrasts 
11 
12 between an L1 and an L2. Our focus is on language and cognition on-line, i.e. thinking-for- 
13 
14 speaking and remembering when language is explicitly used and when access to it is not 
15 
16 prevented  in  any  way.  A  number  of  recent  studies  in  psycholinguistics  have  found some 
17 
18 
language effects on-line in experimental tasks that require active use of language and that do 
20 
21 not impede access to it during task performance. For instance, Lucy & Gaskins (2003) have 
22 
23 shown that the classification of objects in an experiment was driven by the habitual language- 
24 
25 engendered  preferences  of  different  languages.  Levinson  (2003)  demonstrated  that  similar 
26 
27 
language-specific  preferences  are  detected  in  spatial  orientation,  where    language-specific 
28 
29 
30 frames of reference  are  used  to guide  navigation.   It  was Slobin (1996,  1997), however who 
31 
32 originally   proposed   the   thinking-for-speaking  hypothesis   to   account   for   the   variety of 
33 
34 situations  where  language  effects  on  conceptualisation  are  most  likely  to  occur  and    this 
35 
36 hypothesis best captures the on-line effects of language on cognition that have been found. 
37 
38 
Specifically,  as  Slobin  (1996,  1997,  2000,  2003,  2006)  explained,  when  we  think  for the 
40 
41 purpose of speaking, writing, translating and also remembering we use language to guide us 
42 
43 in this process. Consequently, the language we speak affects our thinking that happens while 
44 
45 we  are  engaged  in  language-driven  activities.  These  effects  are  then  limited  to      on-line 
46 
47 
processes and may not be present or relevant off-line, when language is not actually used (or 
48 
49 
50 when its use is disabled; see e.g. Trueswell & Papafragou, 2010). This hypothesis is different 
51 
52 from the classic linguistic relativity hypothesis that was derived from the work of Sapir and 
53 
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2 
1 
2 
3 Whorf and that was seen as advocating a language-dependent world view that may be held 
4 
5 regardless of whether language is explicitly used or  not.  In this study we  are    concerned only 
6 
7 
with occasions when language is being actively  used. 
8 
9 
10 A significant    number of studies have documented that thinking-for-speaking is indeed 
11 
12 language-specific  (see  e.g.  Slobin,  2006  for  an  overview),  and numerous  factors have been 
13 
14 put forward in order to specify the exact occasions when its effects are observed, and when 
15 
16 they  do  not  appear.  We  argue  here  that  language  effects  are  more  likely  to  appear when 
17 
18 
experimental stimuli are complex because the integration of complex information presented 
20 
21 in  the  stimuli  may  be  more  susceptible  to  language-specific  lexicalisation  resources    that 
22 
23 would be activated as aid to memory (as indicated in previous research; see e.g. Fausey & 
24 
25 Boroditsky,  2011;  see  also  Trueswell  &  Papafragou,  2010).    Filipović  (2011)  has already 
26 
27 
provided evidence for language-specific effects on recognition memory for complex motion 
28 
29 
30 events  in  both  monolingual  and  bilingual  speakers.    Another  study  (Filipović,  2013a) has 
31 
32 shown  how  memory for  causation events can  be influenced  by the  language  one  speaks  in 
33 
34 monolingual populations. 
35 
36 
In  the  current  study  we are probing for the  effects of a second  language on    recall 
37 
38 
memory  for  causation  events.  We  assume  that  our  bilingual  participants  (learners  of    L2 
40 
41 English and L2 Spanish respectively) will have access to both their L1 and L2 even though 
42 
43 they are asked to verbalise only in their L2 throughout the experiment. We accept Grosjean’s 
44 
45 (2001) assumption that both languages in bilinguals are always active, albeit to a different 
46 
47 
extent  in  different circumstances,  i.e.  our  participants are  always  in  a  bilingual  mode. We 
48 
49 
50 believe that this is especially true in the case of second language speakers, who are very late 
51 
52 bilinguals and who are less likely to be in a fully monolingual mode when speaking an L2. To 
53 
54 ensure that both languages are active in our participants we give the experimental instructions 
55 
56 in the L1s while performance throughout the experiment is carried out in the   L2s. 
57 
58 
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3 
1 
2 
3 It  is  important to mention that this  interdisciplinary research area  involving  language 
4 
5 and  thought  has  been  much  more  focused  hitherto  on monolingual  speakers,  though some 
6 
7 
recent  studies  have  included  bilingual  speakers  of different  kinds  (e.g.  Athanasopoulous et 
8 
9 
10 al., 2015; Kousta, Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008; Lai, Rodriguez & Narasimhan, 2014). The field 
11 
12 has  begun to appreciate the  importance  of  bilingual empirical  and experimental  data  for the 
13 
14 purpose of linguistic relativity research and more generally, for research on the interaction 
15 
16 between   language  and  thought   and  language   processing  in   general   (e.g.   see  Jarvis   & 
17 
18 
Pavlenko, 2008; Pavlenko, 2014; Filipović, 2011, 2013a). Nevertheless, most of the previous 
20 
21 studies   dealing   with   both   monolingual   and   bilingual   populations   have    dealt       with 
22 
23 categorisation  and  similarity  judgments,  while  hardly  any  dealt  with  memory.  The central 
24 
25 contribution of the present study lies in the fact that it provides both bilingual lexicalisation 
26 
27 
data and an empirical probe for recall memory  effects. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 2.   Speaking,   thinking  and  remembering  in  a  second  language:  Brief     literature 
33 
34 review 
35 
36 
37 
38 
2.1 General studies of language-specific  effects 
40 
41 
42 
43 The question of when there are and when there are not language-specific effects has been 
44 
45 approached  in  many  different  ways,  theoretically,  methodologically  and  empirically.   This 
46 
47 
variability in  approach is partly the  reason for why  the  answers to  the  questions  of  whether 
48 
49 
50 language  influences  thought  have  varied  substantially.  Another  reason  why  research   into 
51 
52 language and thought has often produced conflicting results is the fact that language is not a 
53 
54 uniform, static phenomenon, but rather a multifaceted, bio-social construct, a system that is 
55 
56 complex and adaptive  (see Filipović  & Hawkins, 2013;  Filipović,  2014). Consequently,  it  is 
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4 
1 
2 
3 not  hard  to  envisage  that  under  different  circumstances  of  use  we  may  elicit      different 
4 
5 outcomes  (see  in  particular  Athanasopoulous  et  al.,  2015  on  the  malleability  of  language 
6 
7 
effects). For  instance,  different experimental set-ups have  been employed in  the past,     some 
8 
9 
10 actively and explicitly involving language  (e.g.  Malt,  Sloman &  Gennari,  2003),  others only 
11 
12 allowing  its  tacit  presence  (Filipović,  2010a,  2010b),  and  then  there  have  been  those that 
13 
14 blocked access to habitual language use via verbal interference (e.g.    Trueswell & Papafragou, 
15 
16 2010)  or  via  parallel  task  distraction  (Filipović  &  Geva,  2012).  The  experimental     tasks 
17 
18 
themselves have also been very varied, including similarity judgments using triads (Malt et 
20 
21 al.,  2003),  categorisation  (Lucy  &  Gaskins,  2003)  or  recognition  from  memory (Filipović, 
22 
23 2011). It is hardly surprising that there is no overall agreement as to when we can expect 
24 
25 effects  of  language  on  other  cognitive  functions (see  Bylund  & Athanasopoulos, 2014 for a 
26 
27 
recent detailed overview).      What we do know is that language is closely connected with other 
28 
29 
30 cognitive functions, such as memory as well as nonverbal cognitive systems, for example the 
31 
32 sensomotor system (see Pulvermuller, 2005). By   the   same token, many recent 
33 
34 psycholinguistic studies have converged on the idea that both universal and language-specific 
35 
36 factors  are  involved  in  the  perception and  in  the  linguistic  categorisation in  the  domain of 
37 
38 
colour (e.g.,  Regier & Kay,  2009),  space  (Landau,  2010) and motion (Filipović,  2010b). For 
40 
41 instance,  Regier  and  Kay  (2009)  state  that  “Whorf  was  only  half  right”  since  they   have 
42 
43 discovered  that  language  influences  colour  perception  in  only  half  of  the  visual       field. 
44 
45 Namely,  language  affects  colour  perception  primarily  in  the  right  visual  field  and     they 
46 
47 
hypothesise  that  this  is  probably  due  to  the  activation  of  language  regions  of  the       left 
48 
49 
50 hemisphere.   Furthermore,   colour   naming   seems   to   reflect   “both   universal   and   local 
51 
52 determinants” (Regier & Kay, 2009, p. 7).        Landau (2010) argues that languages have a role 
53 
54 in enriching our sensorial  representations,  even though  spatial language  seems to depend    on 
55 
56 our  universal  and  pre-linguistic  experience.   Filipović,  (2010b)  has  shown  that universally 
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5 
1 
2 
3 perceivable (but not necessarily lexicalised) subcomponents of the manner of motion, such as 
4 
5 pace, rhythm or step-size, can guide recognition memory rather than linguistic    expressions. 
6 
7 
The  language-specific  lexicalisation  patterns  that do  seem  to elicit language-specific 
8 
9 
10 effects are found in experiments that include visually and cognitively enhanced processing 
11 
12 load,  achieved by the  introduction of  complex tasks (e.g.,  when  more  than  one manner     of 
13 
14 motion per each stimuli is presented; see further discussion on complex tasks in section 4.2). 
15 
16 By the  same token,  Trueswell  & Papafragou  (2010) show  that language  can  be   “optionally 
17 
18 
recruited  for  encoding  events,  especially  under  conditions  of  high  cognitive  load”.    They 
20 
21 compared native speakers of  two languages, English and Greek,  whose respective    languages 
22 
23 have different means for lexicalising motion events. In one of the experiments the authors 
24 
25 established,  using eye movements  recording,  that event  encoding was  made difficult because 
26 
27 
of a concurrent non-linguistic task of tapping and that “participants spent extra time studying 
28 
29 
30 what their language treats as the details of the event” (Trueswell & Papafragou, 2010, p. 64). 
31 
32 Resorting  to  linguistic  encoding  for  task  performance  was  eliminated  when  there  was  no 
33 
34 concurrent  task,  which made  the  event  encoding  easier  and  also  when the  concurrent task 
35 
36 involved  the  use  of  language  (counting aloud).  They concluded  that  language  effects were 
37 
38 
“malleable and flexible” but that they “do not appear to shape core biases in event perception 
40 
41 and memory”. 
42 
43 A number of factors seems to play a role when it comes to whether we may have 
44 
45 language-specific  effects on cognitive  tasks  such as  categorisation or memory.  It seems   that 
46 
47 
the  nature  of  the task itself  (simple vs. complex) and involvement  of verbalisation   (explicit, 
48 
49 
50 implicit, blocked) are of key importance in this context. What previous research has achieved 
51 
52 is to clarify when we may or may not expect language  effects and how to determine the 
53 
54 source of the differences between the two outcomes.     For instance, we can understand that the 
55 
56 reason why some studies did not elicit language effects may not be because there are none to 
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6 
1 
2 
3 elicit but  rather because  language  is more  actively recruited for tasks  if the  tasks are     more 
4 
5 complex. The  domain  of  causation  that  we  have  chosen  for  the  current  study  is  an  ideal 
6 
7 
testing  ground  because  causation  events  are  inherently  complex  and  Fausey  & Boroditsky 
8 
9 
10 (2011, p. 155) explain why this is  so: 
11 
12 
13 
14 “Observers must integrate information about the basic physics of the event (e.g., whether the  person 
15 touched the balloon, whether the balloon popped, whether he touched it right before it popped)  with 
16 more social cues about the individual’s state of knowledge and intentions (e.g., whether he meant  to 
17 touch the balloon, whether he knew the balloon was there, whether he was surprised at the outcome). 
18 The need to integrate many different types of information to construe an event may leave some events 
19 especially susceptible to linguistic and cultural influences.” 
20 
21 
22 2.2. Studies on second language  acquisition 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
A  number of  studies in second  language  acquisition and  late  bilingualism have   emphasised 
28 
29 
30 the  possibility  that  learning  a  second  language  may  affect  the  on-line verbalisation-driven 
31 
32 conceptualisation system, i.e.  the  thinking-for-speaking mechanism as  defined and   described 
33 
34 by Slobin (see e.g.,   Ellis & Cadierno, 2009; Cadierno, 2010; Hijazo-Gascón, 2015;   Cifuentes 
35 
36 
Feréz  &   Rojo,  2015;  Filipović,   2011).  For  instance,  Cadierno  (2010)  found  strong     L1 
37 
38 
39 lexicalisation effects  on L2  expressions  in a  study that  contrasted  L1  Russian,  German and 
40 
41 Spanish  learners  of  L2  Danish.  Further,  a  study  by  Hasko  (2010)  on  L2  acquisition    of 
42 
43 Russian by L1 speakers of English showed that L2 online performance provides evidence that 
44 
45 surface structures “mediate our thinking in a non-trivial way” (Hasko, 2010, p. 57). In the 
46 
47 
domain of motion events, the differences in the lexicalisation patterns between English and 
49 
50 Russian  are  such  that  they  prevent  L2  learners  from developing  an  L2-based thinking-for- 
51 
52 speaking pattern  which  requires attending to  and verbalising different conceptual    categories 
53 
54 from the ones present in their L1. Hasko concludes that the acquisition of an L2 needs to 
55 
56 
include  not  only  the  internalisation  of  broad  grammatical  and  lexical  items  but  rather  an 
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7 
1 
2 
3 adaptation  to  the   “new  ways   of  attending  to,   and  think-for-speaking  about,    conceptual 
4 
5 domains that may be encoded differently in their L1 and L2” (Hasko, 2010, p.   57). 
6 
7 
8 Some evidence suggests that thinking-for-speaking is not fixed, firm and static. It can 
9 
10 
change (e.g. see Han, 2008; Stam, 2010), but not all aspects of it change in the same way and 
11 
12 
13 not for all learners equally – there may be a great variability in how this process of change 
14 
15 unfolds  (see  also  Han,  2010  on  fossilisation  of  L1  thinking-for-speaking;  also  Bylund  & 
16 
17 Jarvis, 2011 on L2 effects on L1 event conceptualisation). The factors involved in the change 
18 
19 will be multiple, starting from the learning environment, frequency of use of the languages 
20 
21 
involved,  as  well  as  some  general  principles  of  second  language  processing  and  use (see 
23 
24 Filipović  &  Hawkins,  2013  for  a  proposed  multiple  factor  model  of  second        language 
25 
26 acquisition). Specifically, in the domain of causation, Hendriks, Hickman & Demagny (2008) 
27 
28 have   detected   an increasing   attempt   to   produce   target-like   structures   that  nonetheless 
29 
30 
remained  source-like,  regardless  of  the  different  proficiency  levels  tested.  The  conclusion 
31 
32 
33 they draw is that learners mastering an L2 may require some reconceptualisation of spatial 
34 
35 information  (or  in  other  words,   re-thinking  for  speaking  about  space).   Overall,     second 
36 
37 language speakers have been shown to be significantly affected by their L1 language-specific 
38 
39 patterns of lexicalisation during task performance (L1 transfer, see Cadierno, 2010) but then 
40 
41 
42 again  there  are  also  studies  that  reported  an  absence  of  any  language-effects  and      only 
43 
44 universal constraints on perception (e.g. Coventry, Valdés & Guijarro-Fuentes,    2010). 
45 
46 
47 Studies  in  late  adult  bilingualism  have  shown  that  different  factors  create different 
48 
49 effects on task performance, and in different circumstances different factors have been shown 
50 
51 to  be  the  strongest,  e.g.  L1  transfer  in  categorisation  (Cadierno,  2010),  language  of    the 
52 
53 
environment  in  syntactic  attachment  preferences   (Dussias,   2001),  language   of   operation 
54 
55 
56 during   task   performance   (Athanasopolous   et   al., 2015),   universal   (‘atomic’)  perceptual 
57 
58 features  in  recognition memory (Filipović,  2010b). It  would involve  a  lengthy digression  to 
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8 
1 
2 
3 discuss these and other relevant studies in detail in this context and in any case they do not 
4 
5 bear direct relevance to our current investigation into L2 effects on memory. Almost all of    the 
6 
7 
previous  studies  involve   research   on  categorisation  or  similarity  judgments  and  not    on 
8 
9 
10 memory  (with  a  few  exceptions,  such  as  Filipović,  2011,  which  is  a  recognition memory 
11 
12 study). Moreover, we cannot fully compare these previous studies with the present one since 
13 
14 they are  methodologically  very different from  ours. We  are  not aware  of  any prior bilingual 
15 
16 recall memory study in this area, even though there is a substantial body of work in the area 
17 
18 
of bilingual processing and memory storage (see a recent overview in Filipović,    2014). 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 3.    On causation in language and memory: The outline of the research   domain 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 Causation is a ubiquitous and existentially primary cognitive domain. Speakers talk about the 
32 
33 causes  and  effects  of  actions  on  a  daily  basis,  regardless  of  the  language  they       speak. 
34 
35 Languages  vary with respect to how  they divide  the continuum  of  possible  meanings related 
36 
37 to causation. There can also be more than one option for describing a causation event even 
38 
39 
within a single language. For example, in English one and the same event can be described as 
41 
42 Jill broke  the  vase,  The  vase  was/got broken or The  vase  broke,  depending on how    much 
43 
44 information we know or want to reveal about the event and how much agency we observed or 
45 
46 felt was involved (see Fausey & Boroditsky, 2010 for an insightful study of the effects of 
47 
48 
these  differences  on jury judgment).  Overall,  however,  English  and  Spanish  have  different 
49 
50 
51 resources when  it comes to  the expression of  events in this domain,  as illustrated in Table    1 
52 
53 (adapted from Gibbons,  2003): 
54 
55 
56 [TABLE 1 NEAR  HERE] 
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9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 Previous studies have found language-specific effects on both    recognition memory (Fausey & 
6 
7 
Boroditsky,   2011)  and  recall  memory  (Filipović,   2013a)  for  causation  in      monolingual 
8 
9 
speakers.
2    
Fausey  &  Boroditsky  (2011)  tested  memory  for  agents  in  English  and Spanish 
11 
12 native speakers. English does not regularly make an explicit distinction between intentional 
13 
14 and  non-intentional  events  while  Spanish  does  so  by using  two  distinct  constructions. The 
15 
16 lexicalisations  of  non-intentional effects  in  Spanish  do  not  contain information about agents 
17 
18 
due to the extensive preferred use of impersonal constructions in that language.   What   Fausey 
20 
21 &  Boroditsky (2011) have  shown  is that,  as a  result of  this  difference  in  the  grammar  and 
22 
23 habitual  lexicalisation  pattern  between  the  two  languages,  speakers  of  English  may   have 
24 
25 better  memory  than  Spanish  speakers  when  it  comes  to  non-intentional  event participants. 
26 
27 
This is due to the fact that English can use a transitive construction with a subject and an 
28 
29 
30 object  regardless  of  the intentionality of  the  subject’s  action  on  the  object  (e.g. I  broke  a 
31 
32 glass; Table  1; example 2a could refer to  either intentional or non-intentional event).  This    is 
33 
34 in  contrast  with their  Spanish  peers,  who  use  transitive  constructions  for intentional events 
35 
36 (Table 1, example 1a) and the impersonal constructions for the non-intentional ones (Table 1, 
37 
38 
examples 1d & 1e). We have to note that English also has a possibility corresponding to the 
40 
41 one in Spanish in its affective dative (or dative of interest) construction, which does provide a 
42 
43 clear and unambiguous reference to an unintentional event, such as The glass broke on me 
44 
45 (comparable to the construction in 1e in Spanish). This construction does exist in English but 
46 
47 
its frequency appears to be extremely low, especially in comparison to the frequency of the 
48 
49 
50 corresponding construction  in  Spanish,  which  is  “undeniably part  of  the genius  of Spanish” 
51 
52 (Pountain,  2003, p.  116). Crucially,  not  a single English  native  speaker has ever     used  this 
53 
54 construction   to   verbalise   unintentional   causation   in   an   experimental   setting (Filipović, 
55    
56 2 Recognition memory tasks require the recognition of a correct answer among the ones on offer (i.e. showing a 
57 video and asking whether it had been seen before or not), while recall memory retrieval involves access to what 
58 is remembered without any stimuli as prompts. 
  
19 
 
10 
1 
2 
3 2013a).  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that the  distinction intentional  vs.  unintentional is  not 
4 
5 consistently drawn in English as it is in Spanish, on either the lexical or the constructional 
6 
7 
level. 
8 
9 
10 Further  language  effects  on  memory  for  causation  have  been  shown  in  a different 
11 
12 study by Filipović (2013a), where monolingual speakers of English and Spanish were asked 
13 
14 to verbalise and later recall the nature of the witnessed events themselves (as either accidental 
15 
16 or intentional) rather than focusing on event participants as in the Fausey and Boroditsky 
17 
18 
(2011)  study.  In  English,  the  relevant  verbs  and  constructions  do  not  specifically express 
20 
21 unambiguous intentionality, as we mentioned, e.g. The man dropped the glass (on purpose or 
22 
23 not?).  The  Spanish constructions  differentiate  between  the  intentional  meaning (El  hombre 
24 
25 botó el vaso,  which means The man threw  the glass) and  the non-intentional  meaning (Se    le 
26 
27 
cayó el vaso al hombre, which means To the man it so happened that the glass fell; see also 
28 
29 
30 the examples 1d and 1e in Table 1).        This persistent linguistic attention to intentionality was 
31 
32 shown  to  be  an  advantage  to  Spanish  speakers  in  the  recall  memory  task  of      Filipović 
33 
34 (2013a|). In fact, their recall memory with regard to whether an action was intentional or not 
35 
36 was significantly better than their English peers’ (Filipović,   2013a). 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 4.    Study description 
43 
44 
45 4.1 Participants 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 The participants for this study were English learners of Spanish (n = 28) and Spanish learners 
52 
53 of English (n = 27). We also included a control group of monolingual English and Spanish 
54 
55 speakers, all university students (n=20 for each language). The English monolingual and both 
56 
57 bilingual speaker groups were tested in the UK at the University of East Anglia, while the 
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11 
1 
2 
3 monolingual Spanish speakers were tested in Spain at the University of Zaragoza. Both L2 
4 
5 speaker  groups  learned  their  respective  L2s  at  their  local  universities,  and  had  an   equal 
6 
7 
amount  of  L2  immersion experience  (approximately 6 months average). All  the  L2  learners 
8 
9 
10 were tested in their L2. The mean age of the monolingual participants for English was the 
11 
12 same for both populations, 21.0 years of age. The English L2 learners (mean age 20.5) were 
13 
14 Spanish Erasmus students approximately half way though their year abroad at the University 
15 
16 of East Anglia at the time of the experiment. The Spanish L2 learners were all English L1 
17 
18 
speakers (mean age 21.5) and students of the Spanish language in their final year of study at 
20 
21 the University of East Anglia who had recently spent approximately 6 months in a Spanish- 
22 
23 speaking country during their study abroad period. The proficiency in the L2 for both groups 
24 
25 was controlled based on the grades in the respective L2 language subjects in their studies, the 
26 
27 
information they provided in the questionnaires prior to their participation (comprising details 
28 
29 
30 of age, gender, years of learning L2 and average grades for L2 language exams). In terms of 
31 
32 the  well-known  Common European  Framework of  Reference  (CEFR)  descriptors  for levels 
33 
34 of L2 proficiency, the participants had been classified into two groups (B1-level, equivalent 
35 
36 of the UK 2.2 and low 2.1 class grades and B2-level, equivalent to the UK high 2.1 or 1
st
 
37 
38 
class). 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 4.2 Stimuli 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 The  stimuli  used  comprised  video  clips  filmed  with  a  Sony  DCR-HC18E  digital     video 
52 
53 camera and the experiment was run on a portable PC laptop using Microsoft Office Power 
54 
55 Point. Each target video clip contained an event with either an intentional or a non-intentional 
56 
57 causation event (e.g. a girl popping a balloon on purpose vs. a girl playing with a balloon, 
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12 
1 
2 
3 which popped accidentally and this clearly surprised her). There were 10 target videos and 10 
4 
5 filler videos. The filler videos depicted non-causation events, for example a man drinking 
6 
7 
coffee or a woman reading a book. All the target videos were matched for action type (e.g. 
8 
9 
10 both intentional and non-intentional  breaking events were  witnessed by all participants).     All 
11 
12 the videos were pilot-tested by two native speakers of each language in order to ensure that 
13 
14 they  were   uniformly  judged  as  either  intentional  or  non-intentional.   The   target     videos 
15 
16 (intentional and non-intentional actions) are given in Table 2 and the still shots are given in 
17 
18 
Figure 1. 
20 
21 
[TABLE 2 NEAR  HERE] 
23 
24 
25 [FIGURE 1 NEAR  HERE] 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 4.3 Procedure 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 The  participants were shown three  video clips for habituation,  one containing an    intentional 
38 
39 causation event, one a non-intentional causation event and one non-causational event (e.g. an 
40 
41 agentive  motion  like  running).  They  were  told  that they  would  be  watching  videos  of the 
42 
43 
duration  between  6  and  9  seconds,  depicting  various  actions  and  that  their  task  was    to 
44 
45 
46 verbalise what had happened after each video clip (verbalisation stage). After watching the 
47 
48 videos (which were randomised across the participants in order to avoid recency effects) and 
49 
50 verbalising what they saw, a distractor task of 120 seconds in the form of a 10 × 10 grid of 
51 
52 randomised letters was shown on the screen, and the participants were asked to count how 
53 
54 
many letters M, N and Z they could see. After the distractor task, the participants were asked 
56 
57 to recall the events depicted in the videos by answering two questions about the witnessed 
  
22 
 
13 
1 
2 
3 events.  The  questions  were  unbiased  with  respect  to intentionality (e.g. Did  you  see  a girl 
4 
5 with a blue balloon? Was what happened in that video accidental or on purpose?). They 
6 
7 
were asked to mark their answers on an answer sheet by circling YES or NO depending on 
8 
9 
10 whether, to the best of their recollection, the event in the stimuli contained an intentional or a 
11 
12 non-intentional action respectively. They were also told that they should not guess and that 
13 
14 they  should   leave  a   question  unanswered  if  they  were   not  able   to   recall   the   relevant 
15 
16 information. 
17 
18 
19 Responses  were  classified  as  incorrect  if  the  participants  circled  the  wrong answer 
20 
21 
(e.g. intentional instead of non-intentional) or if they failed to give any response (i.e. they left 
23 
24 both  options  unmarked  because  they  could  not  recall  the  crucial  piece  of  information). A 
25 
26 follow-up check was carried out whereby each participant saw just the target events again 
27 
28 after they had completed the experiment, and all the participants were asked to state for each 
29 
30 
of  the  target  clips  whether  the  causation  event  depicted  was  clearly  intentional  or    non- 
31 
32 
33 intentional.  The  agreement  regarding the  adequacy of  event classification in the stimuli   was 
34 
35 high for both participant groups (97% for English L1 and 99% for Spanish L1 speakers). 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 4.4 Hypotheses 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 In  line  with  the  thinking-for-speaking  hypothesis  (Slobin,  1996,  1997,  2003,  2006)      our 
47 
48 
central  assumption  is  that  the  speakers’  memory for causation events will  be influenced  by 
49 
50 
51 the language-specific patterns of the language they use to verbalise the stimuli (the L1 for 
52 
53 monolinguals and the L2 for bilingual  participants). 
54 
55 We hypothesise that the Spanish monolingual speakers will have a better performance 
56 
57 on the recall of non-intentional events in particular since this is where Spanish affords subtler 
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14 
1 
2 
3 distinctions  than English.  This assumption is motivated  by the  following reasons.  Intentional 
4 
5 events   can   be   described   using   the   same   means   in   both   languages   (simple transitive 
6 
7 
constructions)  and  it  has  been  shown  before  that  the  difference  in  both  verbalisation  and 
8 
9 
10 memory  between  English  and  Spanish  participants  pertains  to  the  non-intentional      event 
11 
12 stimuli in particular (Fausey &  Boroditsky 2011; Filipović,  2013a).   A further reason can    be 
13 
14 due to the fact that even though verbs in English are unspecified with regard to intentionality 
15 
16 (e.g.  Bill pushed  George; Joe  dropped  the  bag; etc.),  the  default meaning is  generally    the 
17 
18 
agentive intentional one and non-intentionality must generally be explicitly indicated outside 
20 
21 of  the  verb, e.g.  by using an  adverb  (Bill  pushed George  by  accident; Joe  dropped the bag 
22 
23 accidentally;   etc.).   Hopper   and   Thompson   (1980)   have   made   the   relevant   point that 
24 
25 prototypical transitivity does indeed involve intentionality.  A transitive agent  is     normally an 
26 
27 
intentional instigator or a causer  of  the action (e.g.  I threw the ball).        In a  less prototypical 
28 
29 
30 transitive  sentence  in  English  the  subject  can  be  a  causer  of  the  event  without  being the 
31 
32 intentional or instigating agent (e.g. as in I dropped the glass). This has been shown to be the 
33 
34 case  in  an  experimental  setting  whereby  intentional  events  were  verbalised  by      English 
35 
36 speakers without  using additional adverbials (e.g., the adverbial expression on  purpose   could 
37 
38 
have  been used  in  addition  to  the  expression X  pushed  Y in  cases  where X  pushed B   wit 
40 
41 intention and yet it never actually got used). Non-intentionality on the other hand, when the 
42 
43 English  speakers  chose  to  indicate  it  explicitly,  was   generally  signalled        by  using  the 
44 
45 additional adverbials  such as accidentally or inadvertently (Filipović,  2013a).  Thus  we     can 
46 
47 
conclude  that  the  transitive  SVO  construction  in  both  English  and  Spanish  is  a     typical 
48 
49 
50 lexicalisation  pattern  for  intentional  events.    Previous  research  (Filipović,  2013a)  has also 
51 
52 shown that most of the time there was no explicit specification of intentionality in English 
53 
54 and that the expressions tended to be left ambiguous (e.g. The woman pushed the bottle off 
55 
56 the table). We assume that adverbial specifications will not be given frequently since if an 
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15 
1 
2 
3 element is not obligatory (e.g. an adverb) it is more likely to be left out. We have also noticed 
4 
5 in  our previous  research (Filipović,  2013a)  that both  constructions He  broke  the  glass   and 
6 
7 
The  glass  broke  (Table  1,  examples  2a  and  2c)  are  used  in  English  to  refer  to      either 
8 
9 
10 intentional  or  non-intentional  events  in  the  experimental  stimuli.  By  contrast,  the   clearly 
11 
12 distinct constructions in Spanish (Table 1, examples 1a and 1e) are habitually used to signal 
13 
14 clearly when an event is intentional and when it is not. Finally, we may have to allow for the 
15 
16 possibility that the mere nature of the stimuli is positively skewed towards the salience of 
17 
18 
intentionality.  What  we mean  by that is  that  intentional actions  in  general  may be  easier to 
20 
21 remember regardless of language since the depiction of intention is made obvious (e.g., in our 
22 
23 stimuli, a girl approaches the bed on which a Barbie doll is positioned and pushes it off the 
24 
25 bed with a clear intention). On the other hand, non-intentional events have an element of 
26 
27 
surprise  and  unexpectedness,  which may be  harder to record and recall  exactly,  especially if 
28 
29 
30 the focus of attention on this specific event feature is not aided by   language. 
31 
32 For  our  L2  learner  groups,  we  could  expect  their  recall  to  be  influenced  by    the 
33 
34 language  they  use  to  verbalise  the  stimuli,  i.e.  their  respective  L2s,  whereby  L2  Spanish 
35 
36 speakers should  demonstrate  better recall  with  regard  to the  intentionality distinctions   than 
37 
38 
the L2 English speakers if they are thinking-for-speaking in their respective L2s. However, 
40 
41 that may be too simplistic to hypothesise for a number of reasons. Our L2 learners will stay in 
42 
43 the  bilingual mode  throughout the  experiment  since, as pointed out  on numerous    occasions 
44 
45 (Soares & Grosjean, 1984; Grosjean & Soares, 1986; Grosjean, 2001), it would be impossible 
46 
47 
to completely switch of the L1, especially in late L2 learners. We have to assume that the L1s 
48 
49 
50 of our learner groups, in which their proficiency is higher, will also stay active. Therefore, we 
51 
52 cannot exclude  the  possibility that  our  participants’  performance  will  be  affected by factors 
53 
54 other than just their L2 pattern; access to L1 and some universal perceptually salient event 
55 
56 features that are not dependent on language may also play a role. If the participants behave in 
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16 
1 
2 
3 their  L2  as  their  respective  L1  monolingual  control  groups,  then  we  may  conclude    that 
4 
5 their memory is driven by their L1 regardless of the verbalisation in L2. If this is the case, we 
6 
7 
would need to conclude that thinking in L1 persists even when speaking in L2. If neither L1 
8 
9 
10 not L2  effects are  detected,  then  perhaps some universal salience  of events themselves   may 
11 
12 be a stronger factor in recall on this occasion than   language. 
13 
14 To summarise, if language of operation was the strongest factor, we could see the L2 
15 
16 learners   of   English   and   Spanish   speakers   respectively   behaving   like   the monolingual 
17 
18 
counterparts of their L2s respectively. On the other hand, if the L2 was not the strongest 
20 
21 mechanism of operation for lexicalisation and memory then we would be able to detect which 
22 
23 other factor  (e.g.  L1  transfer or  universal  perceptual  salience;  see  Filipović  2010a,  2010b) 
24 
25 may underlie the participants’ recall after verbalization in an   L2. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
5.   Results 
31 
32 
33 
5.1 Statistical comparisons 
34 
35 
36 
We  performed a  statistical analysis  using a  two-way ANOVA,  whereby the  two independent 
38 
39 variables were  mother tongue  (English vs.  Spanish) and language  used for verbalisation   (L1 
40 
41 vs. L2), and the dependent variable was recall memory for intentionality.       The test revealed a 
42 
43 significant effect of both independent variables (p < .05). We subsequently performed a post- 
44 
45 
hoc test in order to tease out the exact points at which these effects are located. The post-hoc 
46 
47 
48 Bonferroni  procedure  was  used  to  perform  pairwise  comparisons  between  the  means   for 
49 
50 incorrect  recalls  for  all  4  groups  (2  monolingual  and  2  learner  populations).    Significant 
51 
52 differences were found between both the two monolingual groups (mean difference 0.018; SE 
53 
54 =  0.4) and  between the two  learner  populations (L1 English/L2  Spanish  and  L1 Spanish/L2 
55 
56 
English;   mean   difference   0.039;   SE   =0.37).   There   was   no   significant   difference   in 
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17 
1 
2 
3 performance  when the participants were grouped based on their L1. Similarly,  the    difference 
4 
5 in  the class of grades within  the  learner populations  (UK 1
st  
/ high  2.1  vs. UK low  2.1/2.2.) 
6 
7 
was also not significant (p >  .05). 
8 
9 
10 
We also carried out an item analysis using a one-way ANOVA in order to detect whether 
11 
12 
13 any  specific  item  in  the  stimuli  created  specific  verbalisation  or  recall  problems  for   our 
14 
15 participants.       The English and Spanish monolingual speakers did not differ in  the number of 
16 
17 correct answers for  intentional events (F (1,5)  =  0.74;  p  > .05),  but     for  the  non-intentional 
18 
19 events, the  Spanish monolinguals made significantly more  correct  recalls than their     English 
20 
21 
counterparts (F (1,17)  = 10.05; p < .05).  By comparison, there    was also no difference between 
23 
24 the two L2 learner groups in their memory for intentional events (p = .69, SD= 0.27). For the 
25 
26 non-intentional  events  however,   there  was  a  significant  difference   between  these       two 
27 
28 populations. English learners of Spanish had incorrect memory recalls in 39% of the cases, 
29 
30 
while  the  Spanish  learners  of  English  had  only  14% incorrect  recalls  (see  Figure  2). This 
31 
32 
33 difference  was  statistically  significant  (p=  .017,  SD  =  0.47).  Out  of  the  5 non-intentional 
34 
35 target events depicted  in the  stimuli (see  Table  2),  the  mean  value  for incorrect recall     per 
36 
37 participant  was  1.98 for L1  English/L2  Spanish  speakers  and  0.69  for  their L1  Spanish/L2 
38 
39 
English counterparts. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 [ FIGURE 2 NEAR  HERE] 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 5.2 Verbalisation Responses 
52 
53 
54 Monolingual  speakers  of  both  languages  used  similar  agentive  constructions  to     describe 
55 
56 intentional (voluntary) actions (e.g. The girl pushed the doll off the bed), but they differed in 
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18 
1 
2 
3 the   descriptions  of  the  non-intentional  (accidental)  actions,   as  evident  in   the    examples 
4 
5 below
3
: 
6 
7 
8 INTENTIONAL ACTIONS (no difference in lexicalisation between English and Spanish) 
9 
10 
11 (3a) The woman dropped the magazine on the  floor. 
12 
13 
14 (3b) La mujer botó la revista al  suelo. 
15 
16 
17 ‘The woman threw the magazine onto the  floor’ 
18 
19 
20 (4a) The girl popped a  balloon. 
21 
22 
23 
(4b) La niña rompió el  globo. 
24 
25 
26 
‘The girl broke the  balloon’ 
27 
28 
29 
NON-INTENTIONAL ACTIONS (ambiguous in English, but clearly specified in Spanish) 
30 
31 
32 
(5a) The woman knocked the bottle off the  table. 
33 
34 
35 
(5b) Se le cayó la botella. 
36 
37 
38 
PART  she-DAT. fell the bottle 
40 
41 
‘She dropped the bottle  accidentally’ 
43 
44 
45 (6a) The girl played with the balloon and it  popped. 
46 
47 
48 (6b) Se le rompió el globo a la muchacha. 
49 
50 
51 PART she-DAT. burst the balloon  to the girl 
52 
53 
54 ‘The girl popped the balloon  accidentally’ 
55 
56    
57 3 See Appendix for further detailed coding examples with frequency (in%) for the constructions used by each 
58 participant group. 
  
55 
 
19 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 The  examples  (5b)  and  (6b)  reveal  that  the  Spanish monolingual  speakers  tend  to provide 
7 
8 explicit information about  the  action being non-intentional  while  the  English descriptions do 
9 
10 
not specify this piece of  information. 
11 
12 
13 
With  regard  to  the  L2  learners,  we  noticed  that  both  groups  used    grammatically 
14 
15 
16 acceptable  L2 expressions,  but the Spanish learners of  English followed the  L1  thinking-for- 
17 
18 speaking,  always  drawing  explicit  distinctions  between  the  intentional  and  non-intentional 
19 
20 meanings  even though their L2 English does  not formally require  it.  The  two L2  groups  did 
21 
22 
not  show  coding differences in the  case of  intentional  actions, but the non-intentional   event 
23 
24 
25 lexicalisations  were  more  explicit,  detailed  and  specific  when  Spanish  was  the  L1      and 
26 
27 English the L2 while the English L1 learners of L2 Spanish used constructions indeterminate 
28 
29 with respect to intentionality, very much in line with their L1   pattern. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 [TABLE 3 NEAR  HERE] 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 English learners  of  L2 Spanish tended to use acceptable  grammatical structures (88%    of  all 
42 
43 
descriptions),  but  they  used  them  indiscriminately  with  respect  to  the  kind  of    causation 
44 
45 
46 involved.  For  instance,  they  used  the  impersonal  constructions se  cayó, se  rompió for both 
47 
48 intentional  and  non-intentional  events.  This  shows that  they had acquired  the  correct forms 
49 
50 but were not accurate when it came to how and when these constructions were to be used in 
51 
52 Spanish,  namely for  non-intentional actions  only. This  tendency is in  line  with  their    recall 
53 
54 
memory  performance,  which  shows  that  the  L2  thinking-for-speaking  patterns  were     not 
56 
57 adopted by L1 English/ L2 Spanish group (see the discussion in section 6). This group also 
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20 
1 
2 
3 showed  avoidance  of  the  relevant  impersonal  constructions  and  preferred  the  active  SVO 
4 
5 sentences instead (such as La botella cae, meaning The bottle falls) very much in line with 
6 
7 
the pattern of their L1; see example Table 1). On the other hand, we see that the coding of L1 
8 
9 
10 Spanish learners of L2 English reflects their heightened and explicit attention    to intentionality 
11 
12 even in an L2 that does not formally require it. They coded the stimuli 97% correctly with 
13 
14 regard to the grammatical pattern of the English language (occasionally making errors due to 
15 
16 L1 transfer – e.g. see example 7b in Table 3: the verb exploder (to explode) is transitive in 
17 
18 
Spanish but not in  English). 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 6.   Discussion 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 Our results show that recall memory can be affected in a language-specific way. Monolingual 
32 
33 speaker  groups  confirmed  earlier  results  reported  in  the  context  of  memory  for  causation 
34 
35 events   (Fausey   &   Boroditsky,   2011;  Filipović,  2011). Our   control   group   of  native 
36 
37 monolingual  speakers of English  used structures ambiguous with regard to  intentionality   and 
38 
39 
without  any  adverbial  specification  in  83%  of  cases,   indiscriminately  referring  to      both 
41 
42 intentional and non-intentional acts with the same expressions (i.e. structures such as The girl 
43 
44 popped the balloon or The balloon popped). By contrast, the Spanish monolingual speakers 
45 
46 used SVO constructions such as La muchacha rompe el globo (The girl broke the balloon) 
47 
48 
only when  the  action  was  clearly intentional.  The  non-intentional actions  were  consistently 
49 
50 
51 lexicalised with se + affective dative constructions in Spanish (as in the example 6b in section 
52 
53 5.1). We can infer, based on these verbalisation data, that the two native speaker populations 
54 
55 show  a  clear  distinction  with  respect  to  the  two  respective  lexicalisation  tendencies:   the 
56 
57 English   –   ambiguous   with   respect   to   intentionality,  and   the   Spanish   –   using clearly 
58 
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21 
1 
2 
3 unambiguous  structures  for  intentional  vs.  non-intentional  meanings  respectively.   English 
4 
5 speakers do have a potential option that can be used for the purpose of drawing distinctions 
6 
7 
between intentional vs. non-intentional events (as in He broke the vase vs. The vase broke), 
8 
9 
10 but this potentially contrastive option is not exercised in the same consistent manner in which 
11 
12 the Spanish speakers use the distinguishing options available to them. Expression of agents as 
13 
14 subjects  regardless  of intentionality  in  an  SVO  structure  is a  strong  feature  of  English, as 
15 
16 Fausey & Borditsky (2011) showed, just as the use of affective dative construction with se in 
17 
18 
Spanish for non-intentional event descriptions is adhered to with remarkable    consistency. 
20 
21 
With  regard  to  the  second  language  learners,  we  can say that their memory recall is 
23 
24 mostly  informed  by  their  L1-entrenched  preferences even  when  they  speak  in  an  L2. Our 
25 
26 Spanish  learners   of  English  performed  significantly  better  than  the   English  learners     of 
27 
28 Spanish  on  the  recall  memory  task  (see  Figure  2).  This  indicates  that  the  habitual       L1 
29 
30 
linguistic focus on intentionality persisted in the L1 Spanish learners of English even when 
31 
32 
33 they  were  asked  to  verbalise  only  in  the  L2  English  where  the  relevant       intentionality 
34 
35 distinctions are not  habitually lexicalised.  We are also able  to conclude  that  even  though L1 
36 
37 English learners of Spanish have acquired enough relevant grammatical knowledge in the L2 
38 
39 Spanish, they did not acquire the relevant awareness of the event feature of intentionality that 
40 
41 
42 native  speakers  of  Spanish habitually attend  to  in language  (and  consequently,  in memory). 
43 
44 Furthermore,  L2 Spanish  speakers,  unlike  the  Spanish native  speakers,  used the relevant se- 
45 
46 constructions  indiscriminately  for  both  intentional  and  non-intentional  actions,  while  their 
47 
48 meaning in Spanish is clearly non-intentional. They were also showing the tendency to avoid 
49 
50 
the  use  of  the  relevant se-constructions  and  were  using  the  regular  SV  or  SVO structures 
51 
52 
53 when the se-construction would have been the most appropriate, such as La botella cae (The 
54 
55 bottle  falls)  or  La  muchacha  rompe  el  globo  (The  girl  breaks  a  balloon);  see  also     the 
56 
57 Appendix for more  details. 
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22 
1 
2 
3 A detailed analysis of the verbalisation patterns used also reveals that learners resort 
4 
5 to using constructions that are acceptable in both L1 and L2 even though this use does not 
6 
7 
quite mimic the  native speaker use (see  section 5.1 for the  verbalised responses analysis    and 
8 
9 
10 also  the  Appendix).  This  tendency  has  already  been  detected  in  bilinguals  (see Filipović, 
11 
12 2011; Nicol, Teller & Greth 2001; Lai, Rodriguez & Narasimhan, 2013).       In other words, L2 
13 
14 learners tend to lexicalise the target events in ways that are acceptable in both their languages 
15 
16 (L1 and L2), but their lexicalisation preferences in the L2 are different from the respective 
17 
18 
monolingual  lexicalisation patterns observed (see also Cunnigham, Vaid & Chen,  2011 for    a 
20 
21 related observation). Namely,  L1  Spanish/L2 English speakers use grammatical structures    in 
22 
23 their L2 but they tend to add information about intentionality in adverbial expressions, unlike 
24 
25 the  native  monolingual speaker populations.   This is  because  their L1  requires this kind     of 
26 
27 
specificity and they provide it in the L2 English even though this strategy is not characteristic 
28 
29 
30 of  the  English  lexicalisation  pattern. L1  English/L2  Spanish  also  acquired  the   relevant 
31 
32 grammatical structure but not their appropriate contexts of use. We may therefore conclude 
33 
34 that  full  form-to-meaning mapping  and  understanding of  patterns  of  use for  the  learners of 
35 
36 Spanish as an L2 has not yet occurred and that raising explicit awareness about these and 
37 
38 
other  relevant  typological  differences  in  lexicalization  patterns,  as  well  as  their   potential 
40 
41 consequences, should be one of the fundamental goals of second language   instruction.
4
 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 7.   Conclusion 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54    
55 4 
We prefer not to delve into a detailed discussion with regard to language awareness, which is one of the great 
56 
debates in the context of language learning and teaching. In our research presented here we do acknowledge the 
57 
importance of making learners aware of certain relevant conceptual and usage differences; for an overview of 
  
58 
issues and contrastive opinions in this area see Fukuta (2016). 
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23 
1 
2 
3 In  this  study  our  main  goal  was  to  check  whether  proficient  L2  speakers  of  English and 
4 
5 Spanish respectively have also learned to re-think for speaking through the acquisition of the 
6 
7 
relevant  L2  constructions  and  lexicalisation  preferences.  We  did  not  include  experimental 
8 
9 
10 conditions without verbalisation, or with actively blocked verbalisation, since our main aim 
11 
12 was  not  to  explore  what  happens  when  language  is  not  accessible.  We  were     interested 
13 
14 precisely in  what  happens  under normal,  everyday circumstances  when  language  is   indeed 
15 
16 participating in our cognitive activities, such as perception, categorisation and memory. We 
17 
18 
probed  for  language-specific  effects  on  recall  memory  and  compared  the  results  of   both 
20 
21 monolingual  and  bilingual  L2  learner  populations.  The  monolinguals’  performance  was in 
22 
23 line  with  the  respective  lexicalisation  patterns  for  causation  in  English  and  Spanish.   The 
24 
25 Spanish  monolinguals  gave  more  informative  descriptions  for  non-intentional  events    and 
26 
27 
were able to recall them better than the English speakers. The L2 speakers seem to have 
28 
29 
30 acquired  the  respective  relevant  L2  structures  overall  but  some  differences  in   expression 
31 
32 compared to the monolingual populations were also detected. Crucially, the recall memory 
33 
34 performance of the L2 groups seems to follow the L1, not the L2 patterns. Speaking in L2 did 
35 
36 not negatively impact the recall memory for non-intentional acts in L1 Spanish/ L2 English 
37 
38 
speakers  and  conversely,  L2  Spanish  did  not  make  a  positive  impact  on  the  recall  of L1 
40 
41 English/L2   Spanish  group.   The  linguistic  focus  on  intentionality  seems  to  be        deeply 
42 
43 engrained  in  L1 Spanish  speakers  while  learners  of Spanish  do  not  benefit from  this focus 
44 
45 entrenched in the  Spanish language.  This  means that the  learners of  Spanish may not     have 
46 
47 
been  made  fully  and  explicitly  aware  of  the  relevant  distinctions  that  matter  to   Spanish 
48 
49 
50 speakers and to which they have been sensitivised through habitual and consistent expression 
51 
52 of  the  key  causation  and  intentionality  distinctions.  In  other  words,  an  adequate  form-to- 
53 
54 meaning  mapping  and  usage-driven  full  acquisition  has  not  been  achieved  among     these 
55 
56 speakers.  By  contrast,  Spanish  learners  of  English  transferred  the  focus  on   intentionality 
57 
  
22 
 
24 
1 
2 
3 positively from their L1 into their L2 for the purpose of both verbalisation and memory, but 
4 
5 there  was  a  trade-off:  the  narrative  style  in  L2  English  was  different  from  that  of      the 
6 
7 
respective monolingual English population because the learners used more adverbial phrases 
8 
9 
10 in order to convey the relevant intentionality  details. 
11 
12 
13 It seems that L1 and not the language of operation (L2) was the    strongest factor aiding 
14 
15 recall  on  this  occasion.  We  must  therefore  ask what this  finding  means  for  our theoretical 
16 
17 assumptions with regard to thinking-for-speaking. The  conclusion we  would argue  for is   that 
18 
19 thinking for speaking and remembering in our late bilingual participants is mainly influenced 
20 
21 
by the L1 because these speakers are still thinking in their L1 when using the L2. Speakers 
23 
24 may not resort  to their  L1 in some  other less  complex tasks that they can perform  solely    by 
25 
26 using  L2   (e.g.   categorisation  or  similarity  judgments   for  simple  events),   but  for   more 
27 
28 complex  and  demanding  task  such  as  lexicalisation  of   causation  and  its  recall,      second 
29 
30 
language  learners  still rely heavily on their  L1.  It  may also be  the  case  that,  as  one  of  the 
31 
32 
33 reviewers  pointed  out,  more  proficient  L2  learners  with  extensive  immersion  experiences 
34 
35 could demonstrate more of an L2 effect in this and similar tasks. The current study has only 
36 
37 included learners of relatively limited experience and immersion and this is indeed one of the 
38 
39 study’s limitations in addition to the relatively small item list and participant pool. However, 
40 
41 
42 this  study  did  include  participants  with  different levels  of  competence  and  achievement in 
43 
44 terms  of  their  L2  language  assessment  results  (i.e. higher  vs.  lower  class  grades)  but this 
45 
46 difference did not have any effect on performance in the task. Future research is needed in 
47 
48 order to establish whether immersion and substantially more advanced L2 experience would 
49 
50 
indeed lead to thinking in L2 rather than L1 while doing complex   tasks. 
51 
52 
53 
Our  findings  appear  to  be  in  line  with  the  idea  by  Schmidt  (1990,  1993)       that 
54 
55 
56 consciousness  at  the  level  of  noticing  (or  our  term,   raising  awareness)  is  a       necessary 
57 
58 condition for language learning (but see also Fukuta, 2016 for an overview of different views 
  
19 
 
25 
1 
2 
3 on  the  subject).  By  the  same  token,  noticing  and  explicitly  focusing  on       form-meaning 
4 
5 mappings in instruction can be beneficial to learners, as proposed by Cadierno (2008) and 
6 
7 
Ellis (2008). Furthermore, the results from this study strongly indicate that certain typological 
8 
9 
10 differences  may  have  important  effects  beyond  the  realm   of  merely  detecting     language 
11 
12 contrasts.  They  can  impact  communication  and  the  translation  of  information,  which may 
13 
14 impact   our   understanding   of   events,   our   judgment   and   the   outcomes   of   legal cases 
15 
16 (see Filipović, 2007, 2013b for further exemplification and analysis). For all these reasons, it 
17 
18 
is our hope that this study will inspire similar endeavours in the field of bilingualism research 
20 
21 and  within the  field  of  psycholinguistics  more generally that will  bring us  closer to  a     full 
22 
23 understanding  of  how  language  and  other  cognitive  mechanisms  interact  and  affect     one 
24 
25 another. 
26 
27 
28 Finally,  it may not  always be  beneficial to fully re-think for speaking in L2s    because 
29 
30 
we may lose certain advantages deriving from the L1 that help us focus on certain aspects of 
31 
32 
33 an event. On the other hand, re-thinking for speaking may have advantages for the production 
34 
35 of  a  more  native-like  narrative  style.  This  may  be  the  necessary  trade-off  in multilingual 
36 
37 communication  and  this  is  hardly  a  matter  of  constant  conscious  and  deliberate     choice. 
38 
39 Nevertheless,  it  may  be  generally  beneficial  to  harness  the  potential  of  multiple  ways  of 
40 
41 
42 looking  at  the  same  situations,  whereby  some  languages  will  have  advantages  in     some 
43 
44 domains  of  experience  (e.g.  the  focus  on  the  manner  of  motion  in  English),  while  other 
45 
46 languages  will  do  so in  certain  other domains  (e.g. the  focus  on  intentionality in  Spanish). 
47 
48 The  explicit  teaching  of  typological  differences between  languages  and  their consequences 
49 
50 
along these lines will benefit L2 learners on numerous levels, not least by bringing them 
51 
52 
53 closer to the patterns of use that are in the spirit of their L2s. Furthermore, this may also 
54 
55 enable  language  learners  to  acquire  L2s  better  and  to  draw  on  some  new  categories   for 
56 
57 thinking-for-speaking that can serve as aid to memory and other cognitive    tasks. 
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35 APPENDIX 
36 
37 
38 Verbalisation responses for non-intentional events (with frequency percentage in    brackets) 
39 
40 
41 NB. ‘Other’ refers to expressions that do not mention the relevant   information 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
ITEM 
 
 
LANGUAGE 
Balloon popping Green cup pushed 
off 
Wooden tower 
crushed 
Pen dropped Bottle knocked off 
the desk 
English The   girl  popped The  girl  pushed/ The women ruined// The  woman The women pushed/ 
Monolingual the balloon. knocked  the  cup destroyed/broke  the dropped  the knocked  the  bottle 
 (39%) down. (58%) tower. (41%) pen: (65%) off the table. ( 69%) 
  
The balloon 
 
The cup fell. 
 
The  tower  fell  into 
 
The pen fell. 
 
The bottle fell. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
 popped. (59%) 
 
 
Other (2%) 
(37%) 
 
 
Other (5%) 
pieces/broke. (47%) 
 
 
Other (12%) 
(27%) 
 
 
Other (8%) 
(16%) 
 
 
Other (15%) 
Spanish Se   le   rompió  el Se cayó/se le Se  cayó/  se rompió Se le cayó el Se  cayó/Se  le cayó 
Monolingual globo. (99%) cayó el vaso. el torre. (95%) bolido. la botilla. (88%) 
  (77%)  (100%)  
 Other (1%)  Other (5%)  Other: (12%) 
  Other (23%)  Other (0%)  
L1 English/L2 El globo explosó. El vaso cae. La  mujer  rompió el Su bolido La botella cae. 
Spanish (64%) (74%) juego. (39%) cae. (47%) (88%) 
 El globo se     
  Other: (26%) La torre cae. (33%) Le cae el Other (12%) 
 rompio a la     
    bolido.  
 muchacha (21%)  Other: (28%)   
    (46%)  
 Other: (15%)     
    Other (7%)  
L1 Spanish/ The balloon The cup fell The woman fell The pen The woman  pushed 
L2 English exploded/burst by suddenly/accident accidentally and accidentally the bottle 
 accident/accidenta ally (66%) ruined a fell. (57%) by accident. (59%) 
 lly. (84%)  castle/tower. (46%)  The bottle 
  The cup fell.  The pen  
     accidentally fell. 
 Other (16%) (33%) The women fell on a dropped  out  
     (30%) 
   toy that broke. of  her  hand  
  Other (1%)    
   (21%) (48%)  
     Other (11%) 
   Other (33%) Other (5%)  
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23 
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26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
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38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 Table 1: Scale of blameworthiness (from higher to  lower) 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Spanish English 
1a. Rompí un vaso (active) 2a. I broke a glass (active) 
1b. Un vaso fue roto (true passive) 2b. The vase was/got broken (passive) 
1c. Rompieron un vaso (3PL)  
1d. Se rompió un vaso (reflexive pseudo- 
passive) 
2c. The vase broke (inchoative use of verb) 
1e. Se me rompió un vaso (reflexive pseudo- 
passive with dative of interest) 
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Table 2: Target videos 
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Intentional events Non-intentional events 
 
 
• Girl popping an orange balloon 
 
• Girl pushing a Barbie doll off the bed. 
 
 
 
• Woman crushing a plastic cup 
 
• Woman dropping a magazine 
 
 
 
• Woman knocking a box off the table 
 
 
• Girl popping a blue balloon 
 
• Girl pushing a cup off the sink 
 
 
 
• Woman crushing a toy tower 
 
• Woman dropping a pen 
 
 
 
• Woman knocking a bottle off the table 
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34 Table 3: Examples of coding differences between L2 English and L2   Spanish 
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Intentional Non-Intentional 
• English L2 
 
7a) The girl made the balloon explode. 
7b) She exploded the balloon. 
• English L2 
 
9a) A girl played with a balloon and it 
exploded accidentally. 
9b) The woman pushed the bottle by 
accident. 
• Spanish L2 
 
8a) A una chica se rompe el balón. 
8b) Una niña rompe/destruye/explode 
el globo. 
• Spanish L2 
 
10a) El globo explosó. 
 
10b) La mujer busca algo y su botella 
cae. 
 
  
For 
Incorrect Recalls in % 
L1 English/L2 Spanish 
L1 Spanish/L2 English 
English 
Spanish 
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49 Figure 2: Incorrect memory recall responses for non-intentional events (in % per    group) 
